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Caring for Our Children: An Examination of
Health Care Services for Foster Children
JANET WEINSTEIN* and
JOLIE LA FLEUR**
Children are any culture's greatest natural resource. The future
of the world depends on our children's conceptions of them-
selves. All their choices depend on their view of themselves.'
INTRODUCTION
Children have a right not to suffer at the hands of the system
while in foster care.' Omissions which constitute nothing less than
abuse and neglect, however, occur at levels far exceeding what a
reasonably-run foster care program should produce.' The poor
health service provided to children in foster care is symptomatic of
this abuse and neglect.
Many children enter the foster care system with a history of
mistreatment that is continued or exacerbated when the system
itself fails to provide for the children's physical and mental health
needs. This type of mistreatment has been termed "program
abuse."4 When initially placed, children show consistently high
rates of chronic health problems. After having been in care, these
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1. J. BRADSHAW, JOHN BRADSHAW ON: THE FAMILY 1 (1988).
2. See Mushlin, Unsafe Havens, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 199(1988) [hereinafter
Mushlin].
3. Id.
4. Id. at 200.
5. Schor, Edward L., M.D., A Summary of a White Paper of Health Care of the
Children in Foster Care: Report of Colloquium on Health Care for Children in Foster
Homes. [hereinafter Schor], at 17, citing: A. GRUBER, CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE (1978);
Kavaler & Swire, Services for Foster Children: An Approach to Evaluation, CHILD WEL-
FARE 51, 9 (Nov. 1972) 574-584 [hereinafter Kavaler & Swire (1972)]; Hochstadt &
Jaudes, The MAPS Project: Medical and Psychosocial Screening. Report to the Illinois
1
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children have much higher rates of physical and emotional illness,
as well as developmental and educational deficiencies, than those
found in normal populations.6 As a society we have failed to meet
our obligations to these deprived and most needy of our children.
In allowing this failure to occur, we have compromised our integ-
rity and our society's future.'
In the last twenty-five years, the number of children in foster
care has increased fivefold. 8 Despite the welfare system's well-in-
tended efforts over the years to help children and families, it con-
tinues to be among the most destructive human services in this
country. The children who come within the orbit of child welfare
Dept. of Children and Family Services: LaRobida Childrens Hospital and Research
Center, Chicago, II1. (Dec. 1984).
6. Id. at 1, 6, citing Kavaler & Swire (1972); Schor, The Foster Care System and
Health Status of Foster Children, 69 PEDIATRICS 521-28 (1982).
7. Id. at 17. See also Ammerman, Cassisi, Hersen & Van Hasselt, Consequences of
Physical Abuse and Neglect in Children, 6 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY REv. 291-310 (1986).
There is considerable empirical support for greater prevalence of intellectual defi-
cits and academic underachievement in maltreated as contrasted to nonmaltreated
children. [Id. at 295.]
A robust finding in the literature is the prevalence of externalizing behavior
problems in maltreated children. Externalizing disorders encompass hyperaggres-
siveness, acting out, conduct problems, hyperactivity, and delinquency. Indeed, in-
creased incidence of aggressiveness and conduct problems in abused children and
adolescents has been widely reported. [Id. at 300.]
When contrasted to nonabused subjects, abused children were found to have more
behavior problems and to be less socially competent. [Id. at 301.]
In addition to delinquent and future criminal behavior, child abuse and neglect
have been implicated in other adolescent and adult disorders. [Id. at 302.]
Results consistently indicate that maltreated children exhibit a variety of deficits
in social functioning. [id. at 305]
There is also a problem of the kind of modeling these children receive for parenting
when they have their own children. There is no consensus, but there are many who believe
that abused children will be more likely to abuse their own children than will adults who
were not abused as children. See Kaufman & Zigler, Do Abused Children Become Abusive
Parents? 57 Am. J. oF ORTHOPSYCHIATRICS 186-92 (Apr. 1987); LaRose & Wolfe, Psycho-
logical Characteristics of Parents Who Abuse or Neglect Their Children, 10 ADVANCES IN
CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY at 55-97.
8. In 1984, there were an estimated four hundred thousand children in foster place-
ment in the United States (Child Welfare League of America, Child Welfare Planning
Notes: Characteristics of Children in Substitute and Adoptive Care (1984)), with the pop-
ulation growing 1 % per month by one California estimate (Halfon & Klee, Health Ser-
vices for California's Foster Children: Current Practices and Policy Recommendations, 80
PEDIATRICS at 183-91 (1987)) [hereinafter Halfon & Klee].
Nearly 500,000 children are estimated to be currently in out-of-home placement,
a figure expected to reach more than 840,000 by 1995 if current trends continue,
according to a study released by the House Select Committee on Children, Youth
and Families. Recent census figures put the number of children under 18 in the
nation at about 63 million.
The report attributed the growing out-of-home placements to child abuse, new
conditions resulting from crack cocaine, alcohol abuse and abuse of other drugs,
and homelessness.
Minors in Foster Care, Custody Put at 500,000, L.A. Times, Dec. 12, 1989 at A4, col. 1.
2
California Western Law Review, Vol. 26 [1989], No. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol26/iss2/4
HEALTH CARE SERVICES
are extremely vulnerable to damage: almost all are poor;9 many
come from families racked by substance abuse and domestic vio-
lence;10 and a disproportionate number are racial and ethnic mi-
norities. 1 In many instances, the system intended to help these
children only completes what poverty and discrimination have be-
gun, producing yet another generation of the economically depen-
dent and socially and psychologically unstable citizens. Grown-up
former foster children fill our mental hospitals, our jails and our
welfare rolls. 2 As many as fifty percent of the homeless youth on
our streets are young people who were raised in foster care.'3
As a society, we are very short-sighted when, through our
elected officials, we cut funding for dependency programs. The
amount of money ultimately spent on these children when they
reach adulthood and fill our mental hospitals, jails, and welfare
rolls is by far greater than the cost of providing appropriate care
to children. However, the adequate funding of social services pro-
grams under existing law would not solve the problem entirely.
Fundamental rethinking of the entire system is necessary. 4
The foster care system' 5 has so uniformly failed to help these
children that the 1990s may be a decade of unprecedented litiga-
tion aimed at helping these children via the courts. Litigation has
become the most foreseeable recourse because these children do
not have the access or influence to move the executive or legisla-
tive branches of government to increase the awareness and con-
cern needed to bring about change.' 6
This article discusses the lack of adequate care and treatment
of children in the foster care system, with a particular focus on
deficiencies in the provision of mental health services. It discusses
9. Study of National Incidence and Prevalence of Child Abuse and Neglect: 1988,
Study Findings, Executive Summary [hereinafter NIS-2].
Low income was a significant risk factor for child maltreatment under both sets of
definitions. Children from families whose 1986 income was less than $15,000 ex-
perienced substantially more maltreatment in all categories compared to those
from families earning $15,000 or more. There were also more frequent injury/
impairments at every level among the lower income children.
Id. at xxiii.
10. M. LOWRY, THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS PROJECT OF THE ACLU FOUNDATION AN-
NUAL REPORT OF PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS (1989) [hereinafter M. LOWRY].
11. Id. See also Garbarino & Ebata, The Significance of Ethnic and Cultural Dif-
ferences in Child Maltreatment, J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY, Nov. 1983, at 773-83.
12. M. LOWRY, supra note 10, at 31.
13. Id.
14. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of Neglected Children, 28 STAN. L. REV. 626
(1976).
15. For an historical overview of the foster care system, see A HANDBOOK OF CHILD
WELFARE: CONTEXT, KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE ch. 21 (Laird & Hartmann eds. (1985));
K. WILTSE, FOSTER CARE: AN OVERVIEW.
16. Mushlin, supra note 2, at 280.
1990]
3
Weinstein and La Fleur: Caring for Our Children: An Examination of Health Care Services f
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1989
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
the two traditional approaches to rectifying the problem, legisla-
tion and litigation, and why these remedial measures are inade-
quate. Part I describes how children come into the foster care sys-
tem and provides a more detailed look at the problems they
encounter. Part II discusses the standards that should be imposed
on the system to ensure the healthy growth of children. Part III
sets forth existing legislation aimed at protecting foster children,
and analyzes its efficacy in achieving this goal. Part IV examines
the litigation process as a means for bringing about required
change. Part V discusses other approaches that might be taken to
fulfill our societal duty to our children.
I. THE STATUS OF HEALTH CARE FOR FOSTER CARE CHILDREN
Children enter the foster care system when their natural par-
ents and extended families are unable or unwilling to care for
them. As if this circumstance would not be emotionally destabliz-
ing enough, most of these children have also been the victims of
abuse and neglect as members of dysfunctional families. Coming
into the world and growing up in such an environment creates
substantial psychological stress and damage to these youngsters.
Whether the parental behavior was overtly abusive in a physical
or sexual manner, whether it was neglectful (as is often the case
in families suffering from drug and alcohol addictions), or
whether it was explicit psychological abuse, the damage is done.
Children who do not know when they will receive their next meal,
their next beating, or their next sexual assault, adapt to their
worlds in ways which may allow for their survival, but do not al-
low for healthy functioning and growing into maturity outside of
that environment.' 7
Although removing children from such environments might
seem the most beneficent act on the part of society, the trauma of
separation from family, and of being shuffled through a bureau-
cratic and impersonal system, often adds to the original damage.' 8
17.
That foster children frequently need mental health services has been long known.
Schor found in a study that almost all the foster children evaluated suffered ad-
justment problems and more than half were at least moderately impaired ...
These findings are in keeping with the nature of the reasons for foster care, most
commonly that a child has not been protected from abuse or neglect; the child is
almost by definition one placed at risk for emotional and behavioral disturbances.
(Citations omitted.)
Molin, Treatment of Children in Foster Care: Issues of Collaboration, 12 CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT, 241-50, at 241 (1988) [hereinafter Molin].
18.
The process of placement itself, even if necessary to protect the child, forms an
additional source of distress. Moss and Moss reported the verbal threat to place a
[Vol. 26
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Children may drift from foster home to foster home, never staying
long enough to develop meaningful relationships with foster fami-
lies or schoolmates. They may be subjected to further abuse in a
foster home placement.
If this were the story of just a few, we should be concerned. The
large number of children who must endure this kind of childhood
should make the problem even more disturbing. In 1985, 1.9 mil-
lion reports of child abuse or neglect were made in the U.S. 9
Generally these reports do not result in removing children from
the home,20 but they did for the 275,000 who were placed in foster
care.
21
The current medical care system for foster children is inade-
quate even to deal effectively with simple and common child
health problems.22 An early study revealed that nearly forty per-
child interfered with the child's sense of stability and connection to "home." Dur-
ing placement children experience the loss of a familiar environment and the rup-
ture of relationships in the family and community. Along with the challenge to the
child's identity as a member of its original family, the child may also feel anxiety
about other family members still at home and sometimes guilt at being in a more
nurturant environment than other family members. In the new home, there are
additional issues and stresses, ranging from adapting to a new context, to some-
times having a poor match of personalities, resources, and needs between foster
families and children, to, in the worst cases, a retraumatization due to abuse or
neglect in the foster home. The demand for rapid adjustment during a period of
separation and loss may exacerbate existing problems for the child or contribute to
the development of new emotional and behavioral problems.
Id. at 241-42 (citations omitted).
To make matters worse, many of the children in the foster care system come into the
system more than one time. In the 1988-1989 fiscal year, the county of San Diego removed
2,050 children from their homes. In one study 20-30% of children who were finally re-
turned to their biological families were again removed to foster care. E. SCHOR. PEDIATRIC
MEDICINE vol.7(7) (1989).
19. YOUTH L. NEws, March 1988, cited in Bross, Medical Diagnosis as a Gateway
to the Child Welfare System: A Legal Review for Physicians, Lawyers and Social Work-
ers, 65 DEN. U.L. REv. 213 [hereinafter Bross].
20. Id. at 24.
21. Id., citing 9 YOUTH L. NEws, March 1988, at 5. In 1984, 89 children ages 12
and under out of every 10,000 were confirmed victims of some type of child abuse or
neglect.
The Study of National Incidence and Prevalence of Child Abuse and Neglect (NIS-2)
provides the following information:
In 1986, an estimated 16.3 children per 1,000 or a total of more than one million
children nationwide experienced abuse or neglect in 1986 which met the original
standardized study definitions of maltreatment.
Under the revised definitions, an estimated 25.2 children per 1,000 or a total of
more than one and one-half million children nationwide experienced abuse or neg-
lect in 1986.
Countable cases of maltreatment increased significantly (by 66%) over their
1980 incidence rate.
The increase in countable cases primarily reflected a significant increase (of
74%) in the incidence of abuse.
NIS-2, supra note 9, Executive Summary.
22. F. KAVALER & M. SWIRE, FOSTER CHILD HEALTH CARE 1 (1983).
5
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cent of these children had no immunization records.23 A compre-
hensive study of the medical status of foster children in New York
found that many of the pre-school age foster children studied had
not received vaccinations for the prevention of childhood dis-
eases. 24 Fourteen percent had received no medical examination
upon admission to foster care, and the average physical exam was
incomplete.2 5  Forty-seven percent of the children had visual
problems that had not been evaluated by an optometrist.26 Over
forty percent needed dental care but had not been to a dentist.27
Only one-fourth of the children who had identifiable emotional or
developmental problems had received treatment.28 Similarly, when
children had received medical attention, it often was inadequate.
For example, sixty-one percent of the children who received
glasses were given inadequate prescriptions.29 Clearly, the system
for providing health care to foster children is not working.30
This failure to care for the well-being of foster children is exag-
gerated in the area of mental health care. The implications of fos-
ter care placement in this regard have been the subject of many
studies, yet they are complex and not completely understood.
Consideration of the emotional needs of foster children have fo-
cused on the issues arising as immediate consequences of place-
23. Schor, The Foster Care System and Health Status of Foster Children, 69 PEDI-
ATRICS 521-28 (1982).
24. These findings have been confirmed. Caplovitz & Genevie, Foster Children in
Jackson County, Missouri: A Statistical Analysis of Files Maintained by The Division of
Family Services 86-87, cited in Mushlin, supra note 2, at 208.
25. Kavaler & Swire, cited in Mushlin, supra note 2, at 208.
26. Id. at 209.
27. Id.
28. Id. "There are several possible reasons for the lack of clinical services for foster
children. . . . Traditionally, the CPS caseworker has been expected to be the agent for
meeting the child's emotional needs around placement without reference to adjunct profes-
sional services." Id. at 242 (citations omitted).
Molin provides further information about the problems of delivering effective mental
health care to foster children.
1. Foster parents might have different opinions about the needs of the children under
their care. This is exacerbated by the fact that the foster parents do not select the
therapist.
2. Concerns regarding confidentiality and worries about the effect of disclosing personal
problems may keep the foster parents from participating. In situations where the child is
"acting out," "[a] collusive relationship may be formed, protecting the family and the
agency." Molin, supra note 17, at 244.
3. "Many children are only able to make good use of therapy after they are provided a
stable and adequate placement." Id. at 245.
4. Foster care is decentralized, with little collaboration and communication among biolog-
ical parents, foster parents, social workers, teachers and health care professionals. Appar-
ently no responsible person ever has the whole picture of the child's needs. The decision-
making authority is also fragmented. Id. at 247.
29. Kavaler & Swire, cited in Mushlin, supra note 2, at 242.
30. Kavaler & Swire (1972), supra note 5. See also Schor, Health Care Supervision
of Foster Children, CHILD WELFARE 60(5), at 313-19 (1981).
6
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ment, blame, and loss. Children in foster care often blame them-
selves for their separation from their parents; self-blame may be
an internalization of blaming of children by their natural par-
ents. Foster children may also need to grieve their losses but
may be inhibited from doing so out of their fear that the expres-
sion of their grief and anger may alienate the foster family.
They also may not feel the support and security necessary to
open themselves to expression of loss. They may instead go
through a "honeymoon" period with underlying autonomic dis-
tress before becoming able to grieve.
At the end of the initial adjustment, however, foster care contin-
ues to present difficulties for the child. Children are aware that
foster care is a temporary and unstable situation by its nature.
Gries considers the ambivalence of biological parents, the social
isolation of foster children, and the continuing sense of rejection
and abandonment to be chronic stressors for children in foster
care. . . . Several other studies identify issues of children con-
tinuing in foster care, including irrational beliefs about the rea-
sons for placement, resentment of adults who negotiate their
lives, and concerns about the relationships between foster and
biological parents.3
Foster children are almost always emotionally disturbed to
some degree.32 Although the direct relationship between emotional
impairment and the experience of being a foster child has no
doubt always existed, there is evidence for growing concern.
Agency respondents to a study performed by Children's Research
Institute of California cumulatively indicated that one in every
seven children currently in group care in California entered the
system directly from a psychiatric hospital and in February of
1985 more that fifty percent of children placed in Northern Cali-
fornia foster care came directly from.a psychiatric unit, compared
to less than one percent from 1964-1979.11 Not only are the chil-
dren more disturbed, but they are younger than ever before. Many
attribute this degenerative trend to the increase of drug and alco-
hol addiction and abuse and greater reported incidence and sever-
ity of physical abuse, sexual abuse and neglect. 34
Professionals responding to a study on mental health services
for foster children in California cited four primary barriers to the
provision of these services: (1) Medi-Cal, the low cost state insur-
31. Molin, supra note 17, at 242. See also Howing, Wodarski, Gaudin, Jr. & Kurtz,
Effective Interventions to Ameliorate the Incidence of Child Maltreatment: The Empirical
Base, 34 Soc. WORK 330-37 (1989).
32. J. RowE, H. CAIN, M. HUNDLEBY & A. KEANE, LONG-TERM FOSTER CARE
(1984).
33. CHILDREN'S RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA FOSTER CARE
NETWORK SHELTER CASE STUDY: HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENTS
(1985).
34. Helfon & Klee, supra note 8, at 184.
1990]
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ance plan to which foster children are automatically subscribed,
offers policies and procedures which too greatly limit the number
of private providers; (2) Specific providers are often not trained in
foster-child-specific issues such as sexual abuse and physical
abuse, and are usually not bilingual; (3) Organizational and bu-
reaucratic entropy, as evidenced by lack of coordination, lack of
centralized services, lack of transportation, and lack of training
guidelines for foster parents, prevents the effective delivery of ser-
vices; and (4) An inadequate number of sub-population-specific
programs are available for treating special children such as the
severely mentally handicapped, sexually abused, and delinquent.3 '
II. STANDARDS FOR HEALTH CARE SERVICES FOR CHILDREN
IN OUT-OF-HOME CARE
The Child Welfare League of America has developed standards
intended to serve as goals for the continuing improvement of ser-
vices to children. 36 These standards are statements designed to be
used as ideals or goals for practice in the field of child welfare
service. The basic premises are as follows:
- The right to any immediately needed medical or health service,
including a health screening prior to placement;
* the right to a timely comprehensive assessment of health needs
upon entry into out-of-home care;
* the right to a health plan designed to meet individual health
needs and integrated with the case plan;
- the right of parents or guardians and the child to participate to
the fullest extent possible in the development and implementation
of the health plan;
- the right to receive specialized health care required by the health
plan provided by qualified professionals, in a comprehensive, con-
tinual, and coordinated manner; and
* the right to an adequate referral and follow-up system upon dis-
charge from the child welfare system, to assure proper continuity
of care.37
Children in foster care have the same basic needs for physical,
social and emotional health services, and for supervision as do
children in their own homes. The varied and distinctive aspects of
their problems, however, warrant the establishment of specific
agency procedures to assure that children in placement receive
35. Id.
36. These Standards were generated in collaboration with the American Academy of
Pediatrics in 1988.
37. Child Welfare League of America, Standards For Health Care Services for Chil-
dren in Out-of-Home Care, at xvii (1988).
[Vol. 26
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health care that is comprehensive, coordinated and continual.3"
L.J. v. Massinga,39 the leading case in foster care reform, was
brought by the American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of foster
children against the Baltimore City Department of Social Ser-
vices. The order set forth significant areas or standards with which
a foster care system must comply. These standards are very simi-
lar to those set forth by the Child Welfare League.40
These two sets of standards, set forth by the League and in
Massinga, articulate a common sense approach to caring for our
children. 4 ' For example, health information regarding foster chil-
dren is frequently lost and treatment plans disrupted as the care
of the foster child is transferred from caseworker to caseworker
and from one health care provider to another. The Medical Pass-
port, required by the order in Massinga (and required in concept
by the League's standards), is designed to alleviate this problem.
It is tragic to think that these standards needed to be articulated;
it is even more tragic to realize how far society is from meeting
them.42
38. Id.
39. L.J. v. Massinga, No JH-84-4409 (D. Md. July 27, 1987) (order granting pre-
liminary injunction) [hereinafter Massinga].
40.
1. Comprehensive 60-day Assessment. Within 60 days of entering foster care, a child must
receive a comprehensive physical, developmental and emotional evaluation.
2. Initial Health Care Screening. Within 24 hours of placement, the child must be ex-
amined for determinations of abuse and neglect and be treated for immediate medical
problems.
3. Medical Passport. Every child shall have a Medical Passport that will accompany the
child throughout his or her foster care placement.
4. Comprehensive Health Care System. The responsible agency is required to develop an
integrated, computerized and quality system of health care.
41. An international standard, The Convention on the Rights of the Child, was
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 20, 1989. The Con-
vention expresses the basic right of all children to grow up in a safe and healthy environ-
ment. In defining the specifics of what this means, the Convention sets forth requirements
very similar to those of P.L. 96-272, including an emphasis on family reunification and
regular provision of services and contact by the responsible social agency. This considera-
tion of the rights of children was not a new concept in international law. On November 20,
1959, the Declaration of the Rights of the Child was proclaimed by the General Assembly
of the United Nations (Resolution 1386 (XIV)), expressing the same concepts in less spe-
cific terms.
42.
The health passport, initial screening, and 60 day assessment emphasize the health
needs of children "entering" the foster care system. As a result, children already
placed in care prior to implementation of the Decree must negotiate a fractured
system of health care delivery with little overall supervision or monitoring of care.
One child within the system has still not received sexual abuse therapy even
though he remains depressed, has had episodes of sexual acting out, and has been
court-ordered to receive an immediate referral for this therapy. Directives from
the juvenile court have been in place for sexual abuse treatment since October
1987.
Massinga Compliance Report, Civil Action No. JH-84-4409 at 30.
9
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III. EXISTING LAWS AIMED AT PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF
FOSTER CHILDREN
A. Federal Legislation
The most significant federal legislation dealing with foster chil-
dren is the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,
P.L. 96-272"1 (hereinafter P.L. 96-272 or "the Act"). The Act
was designed to reverse federal financial incentives which had en-
couraged the excessive use of foster care, rather than the provision
of services to keep biological families intact or an attention to ef-
forts to find permanent families for children in foster care." As a
result of the Act, states now receive federal matching funds only
when children are removed pursuant to a judicial determination
that foster care (rather than returning children to their homes) is
in the children's best interest. This legislation gave states in-
creased fiscal incentives to prevent the need for foster care place-
ment of children and to reunify children placed in foster care with
their families.4 5 Although the Act allows for considerable local
variations in how it may be implemented, it required profound
changes in many state child welfare systems.
The basic areas of reform identified by the drafters4 include
the following:
* Improvement in preventive services to avoid unnecessary removal
of children from their homes;
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-675.
44. Hardin, The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980: An Introduc-
tion for Juvenile Court Judges, at 2 [hereinafter Hardin].
45.
The federal law encourages states to prevent the unnecessary removal of chil-
dren from their homes and to reunify foster children with their families by making
state eligibility for funds under the Title IV-B Child Welfare Services Program,
42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, and the Title IV-F foster care maintenance program con-
tingent upon the implementation of certain services and protections for children
and their families. These include the following: (1) limiting the use of Title IV-B
funds for foster care, 42 U.S.C. § 623(c)(1); 2) making additional IV-B funds
contingent on the implementation of preventive and reunification service programs
and other protections, 42 U.S.C. § 627; (3) mandating forfeiture of IV-B funds if
protections and services are not implemented by the deadline date, 42 U.S.C. §
627(b); (4) making Title IV-E eligibility dependent upon the development of a
case review system and reasonable efforts to prevent removal and to reunify fami-
lies, 42 U.S.C. §§ 471, 472; and (5) extending funding for foster care for volunta-
rily placed children if certain protections are provided to the family, 42 U.S.C §
472.
Golubuck, Cash Assistance to Families: An Essential Component of Reasonable Efforts to
Prevent and Eliminate Foster Care Placement of Their Children, CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
1392 (Apr. 1986).
46. Numerous studies which had documented that these areas of reform were both
necessary and possible had been presented to the Congress during the four years of legisla-
tive deliberation leading to the passage of the Act. Id. at 2.
[Vol. 26
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e more careful placement of children to take into account chil-
dren's special needs and to facilitate visitation and communication
between parent and child;
• more efficient case planning and efforts to reunify families; and
" more decisive and timely action to secure permanent homes for
foster children, including reunification when possible, or place-
ment in another permanent and legally secure home. 7
Health care for foster children was not the focus of this Act,
but improved health care should be a natural by-product of the
reform, which was primarily intended to overcome the pervasive
pattern of "foster care drift," the haphazard and unplanned use of
foster care by child welfare agencies. 8 Eliminating the "drift"
problem should assist foster children in developing a sense of sta-
bility and should make it easier to keep track of these children
and to stay abreast of their individual needs. This, in turn, should
result in better health care, particularly better mental health care,
for foster care children. However, because the child welfare sys-
tem directly bears the brunt of other failures in our society, most
children and families still fail to benefit from the federal
protections.
Since 1980, escalating rates of child poverty, growing numbers
of births to unmarried teenagers, increased substance abuse, a
ninety percent rise in reports of abuse and neglect, and now the
deadly threat of AIDS-all interrelated problems-have placed
increasing stresses on families and new demands on the system,
jeopardizing its ability to serve children in need.4 9 Over a decade
ago, we were not even considering the impact of such problems on
the child welfare system.50 Workers, supervisors, foster parents,
and other caretakers do not have the training, support, or re-
sources necessary for them to serve appropriately the children in
their care. Additionally, the flow of dollars still favors out-of-home
care.
5 1
Legislators should look to the future of child welfare needs and
not simply attempt to fix the current system. The onslaught of
unforeseen societal problems will continue to burden the system.
In 1980, Congress did not anticipate the phenomenon of "Boarder
47. Hardin, supra note 44, at 2.
48. Hardin, supra note 44.
49. Allen, Testimony of the Children's Defense Fund Before the Subcommittee on
Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation Committee on Ways and Means and
the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, U.S. House of Representatives,
May 1988 [hereinafter Allen].
50. Id. at 1.
51. Id. at 2. Out-of-home care refers to the placement of a child away from his/her
biological family.
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Babies." This term is used to describe babies who are born to
drug-addicted mothers and who remain in the hospital, often for
years, although they are medically ready for discharge.52 In
Washington, D.C., the child welfare system is in a state of crisis
due to the number of children of crack cocaine addicts entering
the system. Washington, D.C. is not in compliance with the fed-
eral statutes, or its own system, which mandates a prompt deter-
mination of whether a child is in danger or not. Recently, it was
reported that cases involving 771 children remain uninvesti-
gated.53 Lawyers representing children in the D.C. Superior Court
have complained angrily that some children who were voluntarily
placed on a 90-day emergency basis have been kept in foster care
for years, without a judge's approval or representation by a law-
yer.54 It is estimated that in 1989 the city's foster care program
may have lost up to $18 million a year in federal payments be-
cause of poor record-keeping. 5
It is evident the system is failing, and current laws are inade-
quate. Children have had to turn to the courts for protection. The
dimensions of the problem suggest that nothing short of a total
restructuring of the foster care system will do.56
Reform on the federal level is not imminent. Even if it were, the
problems of foster care would not vanish with new federal legisla-
tion, as the federal government cannot mandate state compliance.
It can only serve to offer economic incentives with which states
may participate.
B. State Legislation
A survey of each state's relevant legislation regarding its foster
care system is beyond the scope of this paper. An analysis of Cali-
fornia provides an overview of problems and the current status of
possible legislative solutions.
In 1982, California passed Senate Bill 14 to bring the state into
compliance with P.L. 96-272. 5  Senate Bill 14 did not specifically
52. Id. at 3.
53. Greene, Sitting on a Time Bomb Waiting for Kids to Die, Washington Post,
Sept. 10, 1989, at A14.
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id. at 2.
56. Musewicz, The Failure of Foster Care: Federal Statutory Reform and the
Child's Right to Permanence, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 751 (1981).
57. S.B. 14 made the following changes in state law:
1. Imposed stricter legal standards governing removal of children from their homes. The
Department of Children's Services has the burden of proof on whether removal of the child
from the home is justified.
2. Required the Department of Children's Services to attempt to maintain the natural fam-
ily setting through provision of services such as counseling, babysitting, homemaking clas-
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address health care issues, but its focus on planning and contact
held out some hope for better health care for foster children in the
same way that P.L. 96-272 did, by emphasizing the need for
stability. 8
California has a statewide system of foster care for eligible chil-
dren, operated in each county and funded in part by the state. As
is true in the rest of the country, California's foster care system is
experiencing difficulty because of the number of children entering
foster care. Consequently, numerous studies are currently under-
way to help provide insight and resolutions to the problems." Also
in 1989, the Los Angeles Grand Jury requested Coopers &
Lybrand, a well-respected accounting firm, to review and investi-
gate the County Foster Care Program System. The Grand Jury
expressed particular concern over child abuse prevention and
mental health support. In this connection, the Grand Jury identi-
fied the following problem areas:
1. The Foster Care system may not be adequate to meet present
needs for tracking and monitoring the placement of children
within homes. This may result in children not receiving appropri-
ate support services.
2. Children may be turned away from the Foster Care system
because of insufficient housing and/or foster care homes.
3. Case loads of social workers may be excessive, preventing ad-
ses and, where necessary, in-home caretakers.
3. Limited family reunification services to 18 months and required the court to conduct
formal case reviews every six months to evaluate whether the child could be returned to the
natural parents, should remain in family reunification the full 18 months, or should be
transferred to permanency placement if reunification was not possible.
4. Required courts to adopt a permanent placement plan for any child remaining in foster
care for 18 months or more.
5. Required the Department of Children's Services to maintain written case plans for every
child in their care and to have social worker/child contacts at least once a month.
Coopers & Lybrand, Los Angeles County Grand Jury, A Report on the Los Angeles
County Foster Care Program System (1988-1989) [hereinafter Grand Jury].
58. In January 1989, Senate Bill 243 became effective. This Bill revised the defini-
tions of abuse and neglect contained in the Welfare & Institutions Code, specifying the
conditions under which a child will be brought under court jurisdiction. The law provided
clearer guidance to social workers and judges regarding the types of situations which the
Legislature considers abusive or neglectful. But, again, health care was not an issue.
59. In 1989, the Research and Education Institute, Inc. Harbor/University of Cali-
fornia at Los Angeles Medical Center, sponsored by the Community Issues Council, devel-
oped a plan to implement the following:
1. Increase the number of physicians and dentists willing and able to treat foster children,
2. Improve the collection, coordination, and evaluation of health related information,
3. Provide training for key members of the foster care system,
4. Develop a timely and comprehensive health examination and treatment process,
5. Assure the continuing appropriateness of the Department of Children's Services and
Department of Health Services health care policies and procedures,
6. Improve the infrastructure available to coordinate the health system for children in the
child protective services system.
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equate monitoring of potential physical and mental (emotional)
abuse.
4. Although procedures and guidelines may be established and
in place to support appropriate levels of foster child care, compli-
ance may be inadequate.60
In California, each foster child is eligible for free medical ser-
vices through the Medi-Cal program and the Child Health and
Disability Prevention Program. As previously noted, children en-
tering foster care have increased needs for specialized medical ser-
vices as well as an increased need for "normal" children's health
services such as preventive care, immunizations and treatments
for common childhood problems.6' The studies reveal that while
children frequently enter our foster care system through a health
facility during an investigation of possible abuse or neglect, para-
doxically, the services they receive have little to do with "health
care."
Perhaps a ray of hope in the midst of this rather gloomy picture
is that the subject of health care for foster children seems to be
receiving some attention. In 1989, Assemblyman Charles M. Cal-
deron submitted a fact finding sheet on California's Child Welfare
Services, in which he specifically addressed health services for
children.62
Assemblyman Calderon was denied his request for a Joint Leg-
islative Audit Committee to direct the Auditor General to investi-
gate compliance with state foster care laws, despite his statement
that his information revealed that state laws were not being fol-
lowed, and as a result the health and safety of foster children is in
serious jeopardy. Calderon will be introducing a package of Bills
to improve California's foster care network. The legislation ad-
dresses the two most glaring deficiencies-lack of a standardized,
comprehensive medical program and the inadequacy of the social
service network. The legislation sets forth Standards for Health
Care which include: Physical and Mental Health Care, Medical
Records, Training to Foster Parents, Social Workers, and Policy
and Fiscal Audit. 3
60. Grand Jury, supra note 57, at 17.
61. Id. at 3.
62. Calderon, Assemblyman Charles M., Fact Finding on Child Welfare Services.
Assemblyman Calderon's findings were:
I. Physical and mental health assessments are incomplete and not conducted in a timely
manner.
2. There is a shortage of physicians to treat foster children.
3. Health records of children are not adequately kept.
4. Monitoring of health services is inadequate.
5. The system cannot adequately care for the increasing number of drug and AIDS babies.
63. Letter from Assemblyman Charles M. Calderon (Aug. 3, 1989).
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This legislation must be introduced by May 2, 1990, and would
require approval by both Houses. The outlook for passage in 1990
is doubtful, despite Calderon's plea to his fellow legislators: "For
the sake of the many children who have died and those who cur-
rently suffer from abuse and neglect, we must make every effort to
improve the system."64
IV. LITIGATION
Judicial involvement in foster care reform offers the promise of
benefitting foster children by materially improving a system that
thus far has resisted reform. Without judicial scrutiny, the abuse
and neglect that many children suffered in their original homes
will continue after the state places them in foster care. "For these
children, the temporary, substitute care by the state will not be a
haven, but a hell."6 5
As noted by the American Civil Liberties Union:
We have found that reform through litigation is one of the only
methods available to insure that services to these children are
improved. While these lawsuits take a great deal of time, re-
sources and persistence, it is only through such lawsuits that the
state agencies can be required to divulge detailed information
about how the child welfare system is actually malfunctioning,
and to confront the reality that its mismanagement is hurting
family and children.6"
Children who are in the custody of state child welfare agencies
rarely walk in for appointments with legal services attorneys or
call for legal advice,67 yet there has been a heightened awareness
of children's issues in the past several years.68 Historically, chil-
dren have been considered the property of their parents, particu-
larly their fathers.6 9 Succeeding shifts in the official view of Amer-
icans toward children coincided with shifting economic and social
64. Letter from Assemblyman Charles M. Calderon (Aug. 4, 1989) referencing Cali-
fornia Legislator 1989-1990 Regular Session, Preprint Assembly Bill No. 3, 4, 5, and 6.
65. Mushlin, supra note 2, at 204.
66. M. LOWRY, supra note 10, at 32.
67. Redleaf, Legal Services Outreach to Foster Children, CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
1497 (Apr. 1987). Children are reluctant to seek legal assistance for the following reasons:
(1) Fear of lawyers and legal system; (2) Children do not understand what lawyers do or
how the legal system operates; (3) Children who are raised in foster care and placed in
multiple homes may not realize that there is anything wrong with this treatment; and (4)
Children are dependents and need others to act to meet their needs. (Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 265 (1984)). The younger the children, the more they lack the skill of asserting or
helping themselves. Id. at 1499.
68. YOUTH LAW, at 1073 (Jan. 1986).
69. Blackstone reported that while parents owned a duty to maintain, educate, and
protect their children, it was a duty void of legal persuasion. Bross, supra note 19, at 214.
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contingencies,70  and have culminated with the recognition of
"rights" for children in the decision of In re Gault.71
Two legal principles, that children do have rights including a
right to safety, and that the state as parens patriae72 assumes the
obligation to provide these rights, leave the state vulnerable to
lawsuits by children who are under the state's protection and de-
nied their rights. As a substitute parent, the state's child welfare
program assumes responsibility for the child's physical and mental
health care.73 Those who may be named as defendants vary from
suit to suit, depending upon the structure of the Foster Care Sys-
tem within each state. Possible defendants include state and
county agencies, individual case workers, and government officials
up to and including the governor of the state.
The available causes of action arise from both the Constitution
and the common law, in addition to specific remedies which may
be provided in specialized legislation by the states.74 The Constitu-
tional actions rely upon the fourteenth amendment and its en-
forcement through the Civil Rights Act.75 The common law action
70. Id. at 214.
71. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In this case, the parents of a 15-year-old boy brought a writ
of habeas corpus action in Arizona to challenge the constitutionality of the Arizona Juve-
nile Code. The boy had been taken into custody as the result of a complaint that he had
made lewd telephone calls. After hearings before a juvenile court judge, the boy was com-
mitted to a state institution until he reached the age of 21. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that the Arizona Juvenile Code did not provide juveniles with their due process rights guar-
anteed by the fourteenth amendment, including: (1) adequate notice of the charge and the
hearing; (2) notice of rights including the right to counsel and to confrontation, and the
privilege against self-incrimination; and (3) a record of the proceeding.
72. The concept of parens patriae developed when English Kings intervened in the
familial relationship on behalf of the child because children were considered helpless.
When Justice Cardozo was on the New York Court of Appeals, he described the concept of
parens patriae as the responsibility to do what is best for the interest of the child. Thejudge is to put himself in the position of a "wise, affectionate, and careful parent" and
make provisions for the child accordingly. The concept today is used to refer to the state's
obligation and right to protect the young, the helpless, and the incompetent. Bross, supra
note 19, at 216.
73. Child Welfare League of America, Standards for Foster Family Services 8
(1975), at § 3.10.
74. Where a state legislates a course of action, this may be enforced by an action in
mandamus. In a pending California case (Timothy J. v Robert Chaffee, Los Angeles Supe-
rior Court, CAO0I 128), a class action on behalf of all foster children in Los Angeles
County, the plaintiffs are asking for a writ of mandate pursuant to the Code of Civil Proce-
dure § 1085 commanding defendants to adopt a County Plan For Child Welfare Services
in accordance with California Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 16501 and 16502. Plain-
tiffs are also asking for a writ of mandate to compel defendants to meet the minimum
contact requirements of the Department of Social Services Manual of Policies and Proce-
dures §§ 30-100 through 30-499. These regulations establish mandatory case management
standards for child Welfare Services programs.
75. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
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arises in tort law, specifically in negligence. The issues involved in
these actions are discussed below.
A. Constitutional Issues
1. Substantive Due Process-The Right to Safety
A substantive due process right is a right listed in the Bill of
Rights, and is held to be so fundamental that a state may not
interfere with its enjoyment, except according to strict limitations.
In 1982, a unanimous court in Youngberg. v. Romeo7 held that
the state owes an "unquestioned duty" to provide reasonable
safety for all residents of a state institution for the mentally re-
tarded.77 "The right to personal security consists of. . .uninter-
rupted enjoyment of . . . life . ..limbs ...body ...health,
and ... reputation. 78  The right to safety is a liberty interest
under the fourteenth amendment. 9
B. Enforcement Under Section 1983
The foster children have suffered unspeakable injuries to body
and spirit. They have suffered, it is true, because of circum-
stances beyond the reach of the most benign and effective pro-
tection any government has ever afforded. But, as well, children
have suffered because state officials charged with protecting
them have fallen short of what they undertook to do."0
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
76. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). The Court held that a plaintiff involuntarily committed to
an institution for the mentally retarded had a constitutionally protected interest in condi-
tions of reasonable care and safety.
77. As obvious as this right may seem, recognition of its existence developed quite
slowly and it continues to lack clear standards defining its scope. As late as 1944, the
hands-off doctrine effectively precluded litigation to enforce this right. The hands-off doc-
trine was a judicially created concept that commanded federal courts to abstain from ex-
amining prison matters. In 1974, Justice White sounded the Supreme Court's death knell
to the "hand-off" doctrine in a single line: "There is no Iron Curtain between the Consti-
tution and the prisons of this country." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1973).
In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), prison officials who showed deliberate indiffer-
ence to a prisoner's serious illness or injury were held to violate the eighth amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court declared that prison authori-
ties have a Constitutional duty to provide prisoners with medical care.
78. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 129. This concept of the centrality of the right of
protection has not changed in modern times. In 1918, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes au-
thored an article identifying four conditions that make up the "necessary elements in any
society." Holmes, Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310, 312 (1920), cited in
Mushlin, supra note 2, at 218 & 219.
79. See Taylor v Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1987). In this case, plaintiff was
a child who was rendered comatose because of abuse by her foster mother. See infra note
83 and accompanying text.
80. Lynch v. King, 550 F. Supp. 325 (1982).
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Foster children with inadequate health care present a situation
ripe for a Section 1983 claim. Section 1983 of Title 42 provides a
cause of action for individuals who, because of the actions of state
officials, have been deprived of rights, immunities, or privileges
protected by the United States Constitution or federal laws. As
the Supreme Court has reiterated quite frequently, Section 1983
is not itself a source of substantive right, but merely provides a
method for vindicating a federal right elsewhere conferred. The
requisite elements for stating a cause of action under Section 1983
are: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a per-
son acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct de-
prived the plaintiff of a federal Constitutional or statutory right.
1. Historical Perspective. The enactment of Section 1983 was
the reaction of Congress to inaction on the part of certain states
regarding lawless conditions within their borders, specifically, the
lack of response to outrageous conduct by the Ku Klux Klan
against southern blacks.8' The remedy created was not a remedy
against the Klan, however, but against those who represented a
state in some capacity but were unable or unwilling to enforce a
state law prohibiting such conduct.8 2 Consequently, it is applicable
to the situation of children in foster care because the state officials
charged with the care of these children are apparently unable or
unwilling to provide the Constitutional right to safety that these
children have.
In Taylor v. Ledbetter,83 the eleventh circuit gave foster chil-
dren protection under the fourteenth amendment. The court, sit-
ting en banc, held that allegations that state and county officials
acted with gross negligence and deliberate indifference in placing
the child in a foster home were actionable under Section 1983. s"
The court analogized a child in foster care to a child confined to a
state mental health facility or to a prisoner, as in Youngberg and
Estelle."5 The court followed the reasoning of the second circuit in
another important case, Doe v. New York City Department of So-
cial Services.8 In Doe, the court held a foster child had a pro-
81. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, at 171-83.
82. Id. at 175-76.
83. 818 F.2d 791 (1lth Cir. 1987). In this case, plaintiff sued the Guinett County,
Georgia Department of Family and Children's Services on behalf of a two-year-old girl for
injuries that occurred while the child was in foster care. Allegedly, the child was beaten by
the foster mother and given an overdose of unnecessary medication, causing her to become
permanently comatose. The suit claimed defendants had violated the child's constitutional
right to safety by failing to investigate adequately the foster home and by failing to provide
complete information to the child's physicians.
84. Id.
85. Youngberg, supra note 76; Estelle, supra note 77.
86. 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981). The court held that the agency that placed child in
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tected liberty interest and that state officials had a responsibility
to ensure the child's safety in foster care.
Access to a Section 1983 claim was recently limited by the Su-
preme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County DDS.87 The
Court held that a child is not constitutionally entitled to state pro-
tection unless the state has imposed a specific limitation on that
child's freedom to act on his own behalf.88 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the Court, held that the State had no constitu-
tional duty to protect a child from beatings by his father, even
after receiving reports of possible abuse.8" While this decision is a
setback in the overall scheme of protecting children's civil rights,
it can be distinguished on its facts from the claims by foster chil-
dren, because of the three prong test enunciated in Jensen v. Con-
rad and discussed in the next section.90
2. Special Relationship Test. The Court, in DeShaney, adopted
guidelines which had been set forth in Jensen v. Conrad.9 1 In that
case, the fourth circuit provided factors for consideration in deter-
mining whether a "special relationship" exists between the state
and the individual, giving rise to a constitutional duty of protec-
tion. Specifically, the Court enumerated three factors:
1. Whether a victim or the perpetrator was in legal custody at
the time of the incident, or had been in legal custody prior to the
incident...
2. Whether the state has expressly stated its desire to provide
affirmative protection to a particular class or specific individuals
... [and]
3. Whether the State knew of the claimants' plight.
Applying these considerations to foster children: (1) foster chil-
dren are under the legal custody of the state, (2) the state has
affirmatively stated its desire to provide affirmative protection to
foster children as a class, and (3) through the enrollment in the
system and observation by case workers, the state knows or should
foster care could be liable for child's sexual abuse by foster parent because agency failed to
supervise the placement adequately.
87. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
88. Id. at 1003.
89. Id. at 998.
90. Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052
(1985). The fourth circuit held that the state owes a constitutional duty to protect a child
whose abuse has been reported to the state. The decision in DeShaney marks a substantial
deviation from the notion that all children are entitled to protection. The concept that a
child is free to act to protect itself unless that freedom has been curtailed by the state is
mere fantasy. The fact that the agency responsible for protecting children had received
ample notice of the abuse of Joshua DeShaney and failed to protect him was insufficient to
give rise to the state's duty to protect, according to the Court.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 194-95 n.1l.
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know the plight of foster children, thus establishing the requisite
"special relationship" required to create a duty of protection by
the state.
Although the "right to safety" has recently been expanded be-
yond institutional walls,93 foster children have received little bene-
fit from the right.94 G. L. v. Zumwalt9 5 was the first class action
which provided relief for a class of foster children predicated on a
constitutional "right-to-safety" theory. Its value as precedent is
limited, however, because it was a consent decree issued prior to
trial.
In Massinga,6 the leading foster children health care case, the
Federal District Court for the District of Maryland, when apply-
ing the three factors from Jensen, held that plaintiffs had demon-
strated the existence of a "special relationship" with defendants,
such that plaintiffs were owed an affirmative duty of protection by
defendants. "Here defendants undertook to provide plaintiffs with
proper care and defendants have known, or had reason to know, of
systemic deficiencies since the Task Force Report. Most impor-
tantly, plaintiffs are vulnerable children in custody of
defendants.19 7
3. Deliberate Indifference. Once a "special relationship" be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant is established, an affirmative
duty to protect exists and the defendant may not act with "delib-
erate indifference" to the plaintiff's protected right. For example,
"deliberate indifference" was found in Massinga when the court
held defendants were aware of the serious deficiencies in the child
protection system and their tragic consequences. The defendants'
duty to protect, as previously noted, and the systemic nature of
the BCDSS failure to perform that duty, created a clear likeli-
hood of plaintiffs' success on the merits.98
4. Right to Safety Extended to Health Care. The decision in
Massinga9 linked the right to safety with the state's provision of
adequate medical care for foster children. Massinga involved the
mistreatment of children in foster care placements and the court
specifically found health care provision to be falling so short of the
standard that the children's right to safety was being violated. The
federal district court granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction, sanctions, and a default judgment, while denying de-
93. Id.
94. Mushlin, supra note 2, at 227.
95. 564 F. Supp 1030 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
96. See supra note 39.
97. Massinga, supra note 39, at 30.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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fendants' motion for summary judgment. The outcome of the case
was a consent decree between the parties that sets forth specific
directives with which the defendant must comply. A large portion
of the decree establishes requirements for health care.100
If the Baltimore Department of Social Services could come into
full compliance, it would achieve the standards set forth by the
Children's Welfare League of America.11 This would be a giant
step forward for foster children. A demonstration of the feasibility
and success in providing these services could help to minimize
compliance problems in other jurisdictions..
C. Compliance Problems
In G.L. v. Zumwalt,202 the consent decree approved by all par-
ties was published a03 at the request of plaintiff's counsel and be-
cause of the assistance it may render to other courts considering
similar questions. This case, originally filed in 1979 and stipulated
100. Id.
A. Defendants shall develop and maintain a medical care system reasonably calculated
to provide comprehensive health care services to foster care children in a continual and
coordinating manner in accordance with their needs.
B. All foster children shall have an initial health care screening if possible before place-
ment in an out-of home care setting, but in any event, no later than 24 hours following
placement.
C. All foster children shall be referred for a comprehensive health assessment within 30
days of entering placement. The assessment shall be completed within 60 days of entering
placement. This assessment shall address the child's medical, emotional and developmental
needs. The results of this assessment will be made available to the child's health care pro-
vider(s). The provider(s) selected by DSS to provide health care for the child shall be
reasonably calculated to meet the child's specific nteds identified by the assessment.
D. All foster children shall have periodic medical, dental and developmental examina-
tions. If needs are identified at the periodic examinations that were not identified previ-
ously, the provider(s) selected by the Department of Social Service shall be reasonably
calculated to meet these additional needs.
E. For each child in foster care the defendants shall develop and use an abbreviated
health care record (e.g. medical passport), which shall accompany the child through the
out-of home care system and upon his or her return home, adoption or emancipation. An
abbreviated health care record shall require the following information: the medical facili-
ties where the child usually receives care, the child's condition at placement as documented
by his or her physician, and the child's immunization record, allergies/adverse reactions,
chronic health problems and present medications. The foster parents of the child shall be
provided with the health passport completed to the extent possible at the time of a child's
replacement or if an initial placement within 5 days of placement. Copies of the forms
contained in the passport shall be included in the child's case record and shall be reviewed
by a supervisor at least every 6 months.
F. Within two years of entry of this Decree, defendants shall establish and maintain a
health services management unit within the Department of Social Services. This unit shall
be staffed by one or more health professionals who are trained and experienced in child
health care.
101. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
102. 564 F. Supp. 1030 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
103. Id. at 1031.
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to in 1983, was still in a non-compliance status as of August 1989,
ten years after filing. Compliance has been a major problem with
all the foster children class actions.1 0 4 As noted in the ACLU An-
nual Report,"0 5 the Zumwalt decree has 17 categories with which
the defendant, the Department of Family Services (DFS) agreed
to comply. Medical care is included as one of the 17 categories.
Both defendant and plaintiff became aware that DFS was failing
to comply, and a supplemental consent decree was issued that pro-
vided for a monitoring panel (the committee). Unfortunately,
when faced with the first compliance audit, DFS again conceded
difficulties with compliance, particularly with respect to imple-
menting reforms regarding medical, dental and psychological ser-
vices for children in need. By November 1988, for the third time,
a consistent pattern of noncompliance was revealed, and DFS's
own computers showed significant downward trends in
compliance.
There is a lack of a comprehensive plan to assure continuity of
medical care for foster children as well as a lack of standardiza-
tion in the evaluation process for children in care. Recommenda-
tions by the committee concluded a comprehensive evaluation
and assessment system must be developed and applied to all
children as they come into care.106
Massinga established the foundation for class action suits in at
least five states and the District of Columbia. 10 7 It is apparent
104. See infra note 107.
105. M. LOWRY, supra note 10, at 25.
106. Id.
107. Id.
I. District of Columbia (Lashawn A. v. Barry, 89 Civ. 754, June 20, 1989): This is the
newest of the ACLU's challenges to child welfare systems. The District of Columbia is
considered one of the nation's worst systems. Approximately one-third of the caseworker
positions are vacant while caseloads are 4 to 5 times the national standard, and children
who enter foster care are likely to spend their entire childhood in government custody. (Id.
at 4.) See also supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
2. Louisiana (Del A. v. Edwards, 855 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1988)): The trial in this case
began in 1989. The ACLU is optimistic that it will result in significant reforms in Louisi-
ana. The ACLU expects this case to set important legal precedents that will make it easier
to obtain similar results elsewhere. (Id. at 7.)
3. New York City (Martin A. v. Gross, 138 Misc. 2d 212 (N.Y. Sup. 1987)): The City is
clearly failing to proceed adequately with the reform agreed to in the existing consent
decree. (Id. at I1.)
4. Louisville, Kentucky (In re Michele and Michael P., 78104583, 78J04584 Jefferson
Cty. Dist. Ct., Kentucky (Sept. 14, 1981)): After some delay, the state hired a new staff
person to enforce the consent decree. This has resulted in many improvements. (Id. at 19.)
5. New Mexico (Joseph and Josephine A. v. New Mexico Department of Human Ser-
vices, 575 F. Supp. 346): By 1989, no concrete reforms were being implemented and the
ACLU was forced to file a non-compliance report in June of 1989. (Id. at 22.)
6. Kansas City, Missouri (G. L. v. Zumwalt, 564 F. Supp. 1030 (1983)): The optimism
of 1988 has been reversed. In March, 1989 no concrete reforms were being implemented
according to the consent decree. The ACLU was forced to file a non-compliance report.
[Vol. 26
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that even court victories do not necessarily bring the desired
changes. Actual implementation is a very long process. 108 Eventu-
ally, however, armed with court orders and a commitment to their
enforcement, changes do occur as states become aware of the im-
pact of the litigation.' 9
D. Tort Actions In Negligence
Cases alleging professional malpractice against workers, super-
visors, and agencies in the child protective system, reflect an at-
tempt to use the common law to right wrongs inflicted on chil-
dren.1 0 The Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney may lead to
greater reliance on these actions. Local and state governments
may be joined as defendants in these actions, under the doctrine
of respondeat superior."'
The cause of action for professional malpractice is basically an
action in negligence. To succeed, the plaintiff must prove that: (1)
the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff or to the class of people
of which plaintiff is a member; (2) the defendant breached this
duty; (3) the defendant's breach was an actual cause of the dam-
age suffered by the plaintiff; (4) the defendant's breach was the
proximate cause of the damage suffered by the plaintiff;" 2 and (5)
the plaintiff suffered damages. " a In some situations, government
entities may avoid liability under the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity."14 The foster child has a strong possibility of success of over-
(Id. at 25.)
108. M. LOWRY, supra note 10, at 25.
109. Id. at 4.
110. See, e.g., Bradford v. Davis, 290 Or. 855, 629 P.2d 1376 (1981), a case in
which a foster child received $90,000 in settlement from the state of Oregon after alleging
that the Children's Services Department negligently failed to supervise, screen and monitor
his foster placement.
11l. Social Workers and Liability: Who Should Pay When Negligence Occurs?, 4
CHILDREN'S LEGAL RIGHT JOURNAL No. 4 (1989) [hereinafter Social Workers and Liabil-
ity], at 6. Besharov, Child Welfare Malpractice, TRIAL 56-64 (Mar. 1984).
112. It is necessary to show that the defendant's negligence contributed in some way
to the plaintiff's injury. The "but for" rule has traditionally been applied to determine
"actual cause;" Johnson v. Union Furniture Co., 31 Cal. App. 2d 234 (1939); Prosser,
Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L. REV. 375 (1950). The "proximate cause" ele-
ment limits liability. Rules of proximate cause operate to relieve the defendant whose con-
duct is the actual cause, but, where, because of the nature of the events leading to the
injury, it would be considered unjust to hold him legally responsible, See W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 237, 244 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 431, 440-441 (5th ed. 1984); Burke, Rules of Legal Cause in Negligence Cases,
15 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1926); Arthur v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 183 Cal. App. 2d 483
(1960).
113. Johnson v. Panama Pacific I.E. Co., 187 Cal. 323 (1921); United States Liabil-
ity Insurance Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, 1 Cal. 3d 586 and 594, 463 P.2d 770; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, at §§ 281, 497 & 499.
114.
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coming the sovereign immunity obstacle if the child can accom-
plish the following: (1) demonstrate that the placement agency
owed him a duty of care or had an affirmative duty imposed by
statute or regulation; (2) show that the abuse while in the foster
care system was related directly to the agency's negligence and
that the agency's negligence was the proximate cause of the
child's injuries; and (3) characterize the agency's actions as minis-
terial activities and not protected by sovereign immunity. 15
In Koepf v. County of York,"" the Nebraska Supreme Court
stated:
The placement in foster homes of defenseless children, and the
supervision of their health and care once committed to the cus-
tody of the welfare department must be accomplished with the
reasonable care commensurate with the circumstances. We hold
that the political subdivision of this state can be held liable for a
breach of that duty.117
While a negligence claim has not been used in a reported case to
recover damages for inadequate health care, the Koepf court
stated that the Welfare Department will be held liable for the
health care of foster children.
In Elton v. County of Orange,"8 the court reversing the order
that dismissed the complaint held that causes of action were
stated by a dependent child against a county,119 a county depart-
ment of social welfare, and a county probation officer. The com-
plaint alleged that the county was negligent in placing the child in
a home where she was beaten, and alleged that the county failed
The theory of sovereign immunity originated in the fiction that the king can do no
wrong. The doctrine arose from the practical necessity of enabling the state to
exercise its functions unhampered by the demands on the exchequer resulting
from the carelessness or mistakes of its officer. The doctrine has had widespread
acceptance as a part of the American common law, and has been deemed to pre-
vail except where it had been departed from by constitutional and statutory law as
interpreted and applied by the courts.
People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 2d 754, 756, 178 P.2d 1, cited in 4 WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW 2358.
Despite important variations, all states retain immunity from suits that result from dis-
cretionary governmental activities. In most jurisdictions immunity has been waived by stat-
utes for nondiscretionary actions which cause injury. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra
note 112, at 1048. The immunity doctrine has been under fire by progressive courts and
law writers for many years. It has been urged that immunity should be abolished and full
tort liability should be assumed by American state and local governments. (See Madison v.
San Francisco, 106 Cal. App. 2d 232; Waterman v. Los Angeles County General Hospital,
123 Cal. App. 143, cited in 4 WITKIN, supra, at 2359).
115. Kieffer, Child Abuse in Foster Homes, 28 SAINT Louis U.L.J. 982 (1984).
116. 251 N.W.2d 869 (1977) (construing the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act,
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-2401 to 23-2420 [1943]).
117. Id. at 871 (emphasis added).
118. 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970).
119. The child sued the county and the two involved departments, but the court dis-
cussed the legal issues as though they were but one entity, the county.
[Vol. 26
24
California Western Law Review, Vol. 26 [1989], No. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol26/iss2/4
HEALTH CARE SERVICES
to enforce and comply with certain state regulations governing de-
pendent children and foster homes, which failure resulted in in-
jury to the child. 120 The court held that the state law granting
immunity for discretionary acts could not furnish immunity to the
county because immunity was granted only for those acts and
omissions which involved basic policy decisions.12' The court
stated that decisions made with respect to the care, supervision, or
placement of a dependent child did not achieve the level of basic
policy decisions. 122
In Vonner v State,123 the court held the state department of
public welfare liable based on its negligent non-compliance with
its own regulations regarding medical care and caseworker visita-
tion of foster children.'24 The court stated that the causal relation-
ship between the child's death and the department's breach of its
visitation and medical examination regulations was adequately
proved. In addition, the court held the state vicariously liable in
place of the foster parents. The court pointed out that under state
law, the department had legal custody and therefore the responsi-
bility to provide for the physical, mental, moral and emotional
well-being of the child, which responsibility could not be delegated
to others. 25
The usual remedy in an action for negligence is compensation
for damage which has been done-only after the system has failed
the child. Clearly, this is not the most expeditious means to
achieve the goal of adequate health care for foster children. At
the same time, success in these lawsuits should make officials and
caseworkers expand their efforts to provide adequate care, as the
risks not only involve administrative reprimands, firings, and
downgradings, but also sizeable monetary damages. 26
The equitable remedy of injunctive relief is also available to
children in cases where a tortious act is threatened. The plaintiff,
or petitioner seeking injunctive relief, must be able to demonstrate
to the court that a tort is being, or is about to be, committed. In
120. Elton v. County of Orange, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970). (See
Annotation, Negligence in Placement of Children, 90 A.L.R. 3d 1219.)
121. Id.
122. Id. See also Vosburg v. Dept. of Social Services, 884 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1989),
Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1989) (Placement of children as judicial function
entitled to sovereign immunity).
123. 273 So. 2d 252 (1973) (an action for manslaughter by the mother of a child
against foster parents when her 5-year-old child had been beaten to death by the foster
mother).
124. Id.
125. Id. See also Coleman v. Cooper, 366 S.E.2d 2 (N.C. App. 1988); Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Yamuni, 529 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1988); Turner v.
District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662 (1987).
126. Social Workers and Liability, supra note 111, at 6.
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theory, this may prove difficult in these cases, as there is some
logical inconsistency in predicting negligence. However, given the
pattern of behavior engaged in by child protective systems which
neglect the health care of foster children, it is conceivable that an
action could be framed as one for past damages and to prevent
future harm through injunctive relief. In a class action on behalf
of foster children, the effect could be to prevent harm to a signifi-
cant number in the class.1 17
In addition to proving the existence of a tort, the plaintiff must
prove that the legal remedy of monetary damages would be inade-
quate. In these cases, the injury suffered by failure to provide
health care would meet this requirement because these damages
can never be compensated for with a reward of money and be-
cause the injury is threatened, rather than past. The injunctive
remedy is particularly appropriate in cases where there is a re-
peated pattern of behavior which might lead to a multiplicity of
lawsuits and/or recurring problems.
One possible problem in obtaining injunctive relief for foster
children who are being denied adequate mental health care is that
the desired relief necessarily involves taking action by the authori-
ties responsible for child welfare. This translates into the need for
a mandatory injunction, possibly creating a supervisory burden on
the court. Although courts do not like to undertake these huge
supervisory tasks, the desegregation cases proved their willingness
to do so when there were no other alternatives. 2 8
V. OTHER APPROACHES TO PROTECTING THE MENTAL HEALTH
CARE NEEDS OF FOSTER CHILDREN
The orientation of this paper has been toward the legal system,
examining the instruments available to children, through their le-
gal representatives, to bring about changes in the foster care sys-
127. In Timothy J., et al. v. Chaffee et al., supra note 74, the plaintiffs are request-
ing declaratory and injunctive relief as well as a writ of mandate. In this class action, the
plaintiffs set forth provisions of the California Welfare and Institutions Code and regula-
tions adopted by the State Department of Social Services which allegedly are being vio-
lated and in danger of continuing violation. These provisions call for case management and
provision of services which are intended to provide safety, including, specifically, physical
and mental health care. The plaintiffs request injunctive relief requiring the enforcement of
these laws, a writ of mandate against their violation, and declaratory relief regarding the
duties and rights of the parties.
128. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753, 99 L. Ed 1083(1955). After the court's promulgation of general guidelines for integration, implementa-
tion was largely left to the lower courts. In Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, the court held it
had the power to enforce integration, and in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Educa-
tion, 369 U.S. 19 (1969) the court called for an immediate end to dual school systems.
Massinga, supra note 39, has set a precedent for courts to implement and supervise specific
court orders in the area of foster care reform.
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tem. As has been demonstrated, new laws and court orders do not
necessarily achieve these changes. Something more is needed. The
allocation of sufficient monetary resources would be a significant
step in the right direction. However, our very failure to do this to
date is a reflection of the much larger problem underlying the dif-
ficulties presented by our foster children. The well-being of our
children has not received the attention or commitment needed to
insure the fulfillment of our promises. Inextricably related to this
failure is our history of neglect for the family as a whole. Children
cannot be removed from their families without suffering from that
separation. We cannot expect to protect and treat these children
outside of the context of their families.
The legal system is the driving force behind the child protective
system, including foster care. The laws and regulations which
were initially adopted to safeguard children who became depen-
dents of the court have become part of the problem, as well as the
solution. Social workers, who carry burdensome caseloads, find
themselves buried in paperwork. The many forms and reports
which they must prepare actually prevent them from making con-
tacts with the children, biological parents, foster parents and other
professionals involved in each case. Regardless of how well-inten-
tioned any individual actor in the system may be (and there are
many deeply committed people in this field), the realities of prac-
tice result in a system which churns out human beings as if they
were widgets. The drama of the life of any individual child
brought into the system is eclipsed by a tone of bureaucratic
processing.
What is required, if we hope to produce any meaningful change
within the system, is a shift away from our traditional adversarial
approach to child protection. Although the existing system is, in
theory, not supposed to be an adversarial one, in fact, it is. Per-
haps the mere presence of lawyers has created this effect. This is
not to say that lawyers are incapable of working in a collaborative
way; they simply have not been trained to do so. Nor have they
been trained to be sensitive to the affective realm in general. They
are most often untrained in the social sciences, including the areas
of human behavior and child development. Even assuming that
the attorneys and the judges who work in this arena receive spe-
cial training in these subjects, their approach to their work is not
necessarily affected. Too many lawyers are geared to win and to
think of problems in win/lose terms.
It may seem strange to cast the blame for inadequate mental
health care for foster children upon the lawyers. Certainly that
would be a most narrow view. We must, however, take responsi-
bility for the fact that it is the laws we have drafted and enforced
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which drive the system. Each time we have zealously advocated
for a client in the system according to our professional mandate,
we may have added to that adversarial nature which is fundamen-
tally inappropriate for dealing with family and children issues. In
general, each new form and report the social worker must com-
plete may be the result of a lesson learned in an adversarial con-
text. The need to cover oneself in the context of making decisions
which will affect others is one such lesson. All of these legal chal-
lenges are not, in themselves, necessarily evil; it is the approach
(the way we, as lawyers, see our work and our relationship to the
system) that is problematic.
What needs to happen is a reaffirmation that child welfare is
not an adversarial process and that our work, and the work of all
professionals involved, is to collaborate in the interests of the chil-
dren and their families. Interdisciplinary teamwork provides a
powerful medium for this collaboration. Teams of physicians,
mental health care professionals, lawyers, and social workers can
work together to study the larger picture of a child's needs. This
study, however, cannot be done outside the context of the family.
Thus, the biological parents, the foster parents, teachers and other
caretakers must be involved in a dialogue with the professional
team, to the extent this is possible. 129 Each case, each child, must
receive individual attention, rather than the boiler-plate approach
which appears to be the norm in prescribing services and
treatment. 30
In addition to this collaborative approach, we need to do
whatever we can to put an end to foster care drift. Both P.L. 96-
272 and implementing state legislation shared this goal, but it has
not been reached. Perhaps we should be taking another look at the
concept of group homes. For children beyond the infant and tod-
dler stages, a group home might offer more hope for stability and
opportunity to develop social skills and self esteem than is cur-
rently available in an insecure foster home placement. These
homes should not be large institutions, reminiscent of the orphan-
ages of long ago, but instead should be homes for eight to ten
children, supervised by caring professionals. We must find some
way to provide stability to these children whose family lives have
been so severely disrupted. Without this stability, it is often im-
possible to provide meaningful psychological therapy.
129. See Molin, supra note 17.
130. We cannot and should not expect social workers to be experts in mental health
and to be able to prescribe appropriate treatment for each child. A team approach would
allow assessment by a mental health expert and discussion with the expanded "team" to
ensure cooperation and support. This assessment should be done even before placement to
assure the best match between foster child and foster parents.
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Another idea we should explore is the professionalization of fos-
ter parenting. This is not to say that the receipt of a particular
academic degree would entitle a person to be a foster parent. It
has much more to do with our attitude toward the people who
dedicate themselves to these children. Foster parents need to be
trained to provide such services, have their work monitored by
peers and be included in the decision making process for their fos-
ter children. They should receive the recognition and the compen-
sation that we expect to give those who are working in other "re-
spectable" service professions such as medicine or law.' The
professionalization of foster care could help to create a cadre of
"parents" who would provide the caring and the modeling needed
by children who must be separated from their families.'32 As a
society, we have not been forthcoming in our recognition of the
similar contribution made by our school teachers, so such a goal
seems unrealistic for the near future.
A combination of collaboration and professional foster parent-
ing should effect a maximization of matching between foster par-
ents and foster children. Incorrect matches currently contribute to
foster drift as the child is moved from one home to another. In
addition, these mismatches cause disruption within foster homes,
making it difficult for even the best of foster families.
We need to recognize foster parenting as a therapeutic ven-
ture. 3' The first step in accomplishing therapeutic goals would be
131. Foster parenting must not be used as a means to bolster income.
Charles Loring Brace is credited with originating modern foster family care. His
avowed motive was to rescue children from the exigencies of destitution and va-
grancy. The street vagrants and the children's institutions of New York City were
his first and primary sources of destitute and dependent children. . . . Commit-
tees of local citizens prepared the way with appeals to Christian charity spiced
with an appeal to people's self-interest in that the farmers and tradesmen who
took a destitute child would obtain free labor for farm or shop. In substance, ap-
peals by present day foster home recruiters are much the same except that the
appeal to charity is more subtle and the appeal to self-interest expressed in cash
rather than in kind - that is, board payments rather than free labor.
Wiltse, Foster Care An Overview, A HANDBOOK OF CHILD WELFARE: CONTEXT, KNOWL-
EDGE AND PRACTICE 568-69 (1985).
132. The manual of policies and procedures for the San Diego Foster Family Homes
holds that training be required for potential foster parents (Section 87017). This 12 hours
of training is given without a final evaluation of learning. Training, beyond basic three
hour classes in discipline, self-esteem, child abuse, and fostering's impact on the family,
could be developed for participants. Further, current state-of-the-art education techniques
such as integrated programmed learning/response and interactive roleplaying could be uti-
lized to test whether the potential foster parents really learn something.
133. A five-year longitudinal study performed by Fanshel and Shinn, (D. FANSHEL
& E.B. SHINN, CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: A LONGITUDINAL INVESTIGATION (1978))
showed that fostering can be therapeutic. Twenty-five percent of foster children in this
New York study moved from "abnormal" or "suspect" classification to "normal" by the
third year of testing. On the other hand, another 12% did not improve, while another 12%
moved from "normal" to the "abnormal" or "suspect" categories. Realizing that there is a
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to ensure that mental health screenings are performed at in-
take." A thorough psychological evaluation for each child upon
entry to the system, as well as a more rigorous appraisal of each
foster parent's ability to supply an emotionally healing environ-
ment, would move us closer to success in this venture. Based on
initial psychological evaluation, caution could be taken to see that
children with specific emotional needs are not placed where addi-
tional abuse would be inadvertently precipitated. l3 5 Perhaps the
most effective thing that could be done to provide required mental
health care services to foster children would be to keep them out
of the foster care system altogether. In-home treatment of abusive
families has been the subject of study in California and the initial
results are promising.'3 6 A substantial obstacle to the provision of
effective mental health care to children is the instability they face
in the foster care system. Allowing the children to remain at home
with their families, while providing the intensive services required
to help the family learn to cope, may be a good alternative for
most of the children who come through the system. Naturally, it
would not be an appropriate course of action, nor would it be con-
sidered, in a case where the child would be placed in danger by
remaining in the home, or where the child was afraid to remain in
the home. However, most cases of abuse and neglect do not in-
volve the degree of severity which would require removal if these
in-home services could be provided. 37
CONCLUSION
Essentially, the underlying need in all of these suggestions is a
reordering of societal values. Unless and until we choose to place
children and families at least near the top of our list of priorities,
we can expect the same old bureaucratic shuffling. This article has
examined two law-based approaches to the problem of providing
potential for good as well as harm, we need to consider ways to maximize the former and
minimize the latter. Strategic foster child-parent-matching could eliminate much of this
chance improvement.
134. Halfon & Klee, supra note 8, studied 14 California counties and found that
fewer than 10% of the children received mental health screening at intake into the foster
care system.
135. For example, the manual of policies and procedures for the San Diego Foster
Family Homes (section 87040) holds that application for licensure shall not be denied be-
cause a parent uses corporal punishment on his/her own children. Even though such pun-
ishment may never be used to discipline a foster child, the psychological effect of witness-
ing such punishment on the already anxious and hypervigilant child-victim of physical
abuse is unquestionably abusive in itself.
136. See Wood & Barton, In-Home Treatment of Abusive Families: Cost and
Placement at One Year, 25 PSYCHOTHERAPY 409-14 (1988).
137. NIS-2, supra note 9.
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foster children adequate health care. Because the resolution to the
problem is complex, there is no simple answer. Resolution through
legislation does not appear to be imminent. Federal legislation
only offers economic incentives to states, and individual states
have not been prepared to cope with the increase of children en-
tering the system both in terms of numbers and the unanticipated
nature of the social problems attached to addiction and abuse and
neglect.
On the other hand, litigation as a solution appears, at first
glance, to have been more successful. Although it rarely answers
the problems for an individual child hurt by the system, it may
serve the more global purpose of warning states that providing
foster children adequate services, including health care, is more
economically prudent than losing a costly lawsuit. However, com-
pliance problems severely limit the overall effectiveness of
litigation.
Litigation and legislation alone will not build the kind of foster
care system which our children deserve. A commitment of mone-
tary resources would go a long way in improving the present pro-
vision of services, but would not be the final answer. Viewing fos-
ter parenting as the primary therapeutic process for these children
is a workable and economically feasible approach. Better educa-
tion and selection of foster parents will further serve to encourage
program self-administration and reduce the burdens of over-
worked social workers. Adjustments in the Medi-Cal system,
which would prioritize rather than inhibit psychological services,
would facilitate prompt and thorough evaluation of each child. It
would also encourage the involvement of enough quality profes-
sional help to the most needy among this population, both in ini-
tial group care and throughout foster placement.
Ultimately, the kind of commitment needed to make a signifi-
cant change in the lives of foster children is one of heart, demon-
strated by a genuine concern for the well-being of each child (and
his or her family) that enters the system. Attitudes of collabora-
tion and teamwork, rather than adversarialness, need to be
adopted by all the professionals involved.
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